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ABSTRACT 
The literature on the exchange-rate-based stabilization has focused almost 
exclusively in Latin America. Many other countries however, such as Egypt, 
Lebanon and Turkey; have undertaken this sort of programs in the last 10-15 
years. I depart from the existing literature by developing a model specifically for 
the 2000-2001 heterodox exchange-rate-based stabilization program in Turkey: 
When the government lowers the rate of crawl, the rate of domestic credit creation 
is set equal to the lower rate of crawl, bond sales finance the fiscal deficit, and 
money growth occurs only through capital inflows. Without appealing to high 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution, the model does very well at replicating the 
magnitude of the current account deficit (5.5% of GDP predicted vs. 5% of GNP 
actual), the peak in total consumption spending (10.08% predicted vs. 9.6% 
actual), average growth rate in total consumption spending (6.7% predicted vs. 
6% actual), the peak in durables spending (37.06% predicted vs. 39.5% actual), 
and the average growth rate in durables spending (24% predicted vs. 27.4% 
actual) observed in Turkey following the inception of the program.  
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The difference between an exchange-rate-based stabilization (ERBS henceforth) and a 
money-based stabilization formally lies in the selection of the nominal anchor:  the 
exchange rate or a monetary aggregate. However, the consequences of the choice of the 
nominal anchor differ considerably: Inflation stabilization programs that use money as the 
nominal anchor involve an initial recession followed by the recovery of economic activity. 
Tight monetary policy brings down inflation gradually at the cost of higher unemployment 
and lower output. 
      Based on the experience from money-based stabilization programs, disinflation has 
been viewed as contractionary. Although the conventional view about the contractionary 
effects of inflation stabilization has not gone unchallenged1, the fundamental challenge 
emerged in the late 1970s when Chile, Argentina and Uruguay relied on an exchange rate 
peg as the main instrument of disinflation. These programs, known as the Southern Cone 
tablitas, followed strict orthodox lines in the sense that  exchange rate was the sole nominal 
anchor. Inflation was to decline quickly to the rate of devaluation. Contrary to the 
expectations, however, the inflation declined only slowly, which resulted in a sustained 
and large real exchange rate appreciation.2Disinflation was accompanied by a boom in 
private consumption and real GDP. A more striking fact was the surge in consumers’ 
demand for durable goods.3 The recessionary phase appeared only later in the programs. 
And the programs eventually ended in full-blown balance of payments crises with costly 
devaluations and large losses of international reserves. In the mid 1980s, Argentina, Brazil, 
and Israel supplemented exchange rate with wage-price controls to bring down inflation 
quickly. In these heterodox exchange-rate-based stabilization plans inflation came down 
rapidly to much lower levels compared with the Southern Cone orthodox ERBS episodes.  
                                                 
1 Sargent (1982), Vegh (1992). 
2 In Uruguay, real exchange rate appreciated by a staggering 78.8% (Table.5 in Calvo and Vegh, 1995). 
During the Chilean tablita, real exchange rate appreciated by 25%.  And in Argentina, real appreciation was 
15% (Table.1 in Helpman and Razin, 1987). 
3 In Chile, real per capita consumption of durable goods rose by 120-130% from the beginning of the 
program to the year in which private consumption peaked. In Uruguay, real per capita car sales (a proxy for 
durable goods) rose by 140% from the beginning of the program to the year in which private consumption 
peaked (Figure.1 in De Gregorio et.al, 1998). In the case of Argentine tablita, the average annual real rate of 
growth of car sales in the three years before the plan was -7.2%. The growth rate jumped to 31.9% in the 
early stages of the program (Table.1 in De Gregorio et.al, 1998). 
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Real appreciation remained as an issue however, and the boom-recession cycle observed in 
the Southern Cone tablitas reemerged. 
      The experience from ERBS programs generated a very controversial literature 
regarding the effects of disinflation programs especially on real consumption and output. 
Based on the twelve major ERBS programs which were undertaken in Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Israel, Mexico and Uruguay empirical studies in the eighties and early nineties have 
identified the following stylized facts associated with ERBS4: After the exchange rate is 
fixed, private consumption rises rapidly driven mainly by a boom in consumption of 
durable goods and continues to increase for several years. Large increases in imports of 
durable goods lead a considerable deterioration in trade balance. The increase in 
consumption is accompanied by an expansion in output in the early stages. Inflation 
usually falls, but convergence to the devaluation rate is slow and incomplete, which results 
in sustained real exchange rate appreciation. During the program, the current account 
deficit increases sharply and is financed by large capital inflows, leading to an increase in 
foreign liabilities. The capital inflows are also associated with a large increase in the ratio 
of money balances to GDP. The duration and depth of this expansionary phase varies 
considerably across stabilization episodes. Later on, however, the initial boom is reversed 
and real output contracts. The recession may occur either before or when the program ends. 
Most of the time, it starts before the program ends and as the recession sets in the real 
exchange rate continues to appreciate. The program ends usually with a massive attack on 
currency, is followed by a sharp nominal devaluation; sometimes inflation then surges to a 
level even higher than before the program was implemented.5  
      Aside from the empirical studies, various theoretical models have been advanced in 
order to replicate and explain the stylized facts associated with ERBS programs. One of 
these, often referred to as the “weak credibility”, is predicated on the idea that given a long 
                                                 
4 Corbo (1985), Hanson and de Melo (1985), Kiguel and Liviatan (1992), Vegh (1992), Reinhart and Vegh 
(1995b), De Gregorio et al. (1998), Calvo and Vegh (1999).  
5 Although later empirical studies based on larger and more diverse panel data sets (Easterly, 1996; Hamann, 
2001; Hamann et. al., 2005) dispute the validity of empirical regularities associated with ERBS, the results 
found can be doubted considering the major obstacles that these studies face about the definition of 
stabilization episodes, the classification of episodes by type of nominal anchor, and the need to control for 
other domestic and external shocks. Overall, the evidence supports the view that there exists a boom-bust 
cycle associated with exchange rate based stabilization plans. 
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history of failed disinflation policies stabilization attempts in chronic inflation countries 
are likely to suffer from lack of credibility. Weak credibility has been first introduced by 
Calvo (1986). Later, Calvo and Vegh (1993) developed this theory further by adding non-
traded good and sticky prices. Models of weak credibility rely on intertemporal 
substitution effects as the key channel through which stabilization plans may have real 
effects. When the reduction in the rate of devaluation is not credible, in the sense that the 
public expects that the program will be abandoned at some point in the future, the fall in 
the nominal interest rate resulting from the lower devaluation rate and perfect capital 
mobility, is viewed as temporary. Because of the cash-in-advance constraint this temporary 
fall in the nominal interest rate reduces the effective price of consumption today relative to 
the future. Hence, demand for both traded and non-traded goods increases and leads to an 
initial expansion in the non-traded goods sector and a current account deficit. Since prices 
are sticky, the slow convergence of inflation results in a sustained real exchange rate 
appreciation, which eventually reduces the demand for non-traded goods. As a 
consequence, output falls and a recession sets in. The recession may occur either before or 
when the program ends.  
      The qualitative predictions of Calvo and Vegh (1993) are generally consistent with the 
stylized facts. As for its quantitative explanatory power, the theory has been criticized for 
relying on high intertemporal elasticity of substitution to be able to generate strong short-
run quantitative effects comparable to those observed in the data6.  Reinhart and Vegh 
(1995a) have examined the empirical relevance of this hypothesis, by estimating the 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution for five chronic inflation countries (Argentina, 
Brazil, Israel, Mexico, and Uruguay). Using these estimates, ranging from 0.19 to 0.53, 
they computed the predicted increases in consumption for seven major ERBS programs 
(the Southern-Cone orthodox stabilizations of the 1970s in Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile; 
and the heterodox stabilizations of the 1980s in Brazil, Argentina, Israel, and Mexico). 
Unfortunately, weak credibility could account for 60 percent of the observed increase in 
consumption in the four heterodox plans, whereas it could account for only about 10 
                                                 
6 Estimates  places intertemporal elasticity of substitution between .20 and .50 for developing countries 
(Table 10.1 in Agenor and Montiel, 1996).   
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percent of the actual increase in consumption in the Southern Cone tablitas. Later, Uribe 
(2002) introduced habit formation in a general equilibrium context with flexible prices and 
weak credibility. When combined with habit formation, weak credibility generates the 
stylized facts very well at a qualitative level. However, adding habit formation has not 
improved the quantitative aspect of the results. Predicted consumption boom, real 
exchange rate appreciation and current account deficit were still smaller than those 
observed during ERBS programs.  
      Recently, Atolia and Buffie (2005) have established the additional quantitative power 
of weak credibility hypothesis via its impact on durables spending. In the model they 
developed, the private sector consumes both durable and nondurable goods, domestic and 
foreign currency are imperfect substitutes, prices are sticky, and fiscal adjustment is 
delayed until after ERBS collapses. Consumption boom and real exchange rate 
appreciations generated in this model are in the order of magnitude that has been observed 
in ERBS programs. Incorporating durable consumer goods particularly improves the 
quantitative power of the weak credibility cum sticky prices hypothesis by generating a 
strong consumption boom even with very low values for the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution. Durables expenditure is a form of investment because most of the good is 
consumed in the future. Therefore, irrespective of whether the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution is large or small, there is an incentive to make large purchases of durable good 
when its price is temporarily low. This is what Calvo (1988) calls intertemporal price 
speculation. 
 
      This paper is another attempt to explain the stylized facts surrounding ERBS by appeal 
to weak credibility cum sticky prices. I work with a variant of the model developed in 
Atolia and Buffie (2005), which is a currency substitution model of a small open economy 
that operates under an open capital account and a crawling peg exchange rate. My model 
differs in two respects, however: First, I relax the assumption that traded and nontraded 
durables are consumed in fixed proportions. Second, I analyze a heterodox program where 
bond sales finance the fiscal deficit and money growth occurs only through capital inflows. 
Furthermore, by developing a model specifically for the 2000-2001 heterodox ERBS 
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program in Turkey, I also depart from the existing literature which has focused almost 
exclusively in Latin America.  
      In order to asses the model’s quantitative performance; it is calibrated by using data 
restrictions mainly from the Turkish economy. Without appealing to high intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution, the model can generate consumption boom, the current account 
deficit, and real exchange rate appreciation that are comparable to those observed in 
Turkey in the aftermath of 2000-2001 ERBS program. The single major shortcoming is 
regarding the timing of the response of consumption. Instead of displaying an inverted-U 
shape, consumption declines steadily after a one time jump at the time the policy is 
announced. Following Atolia and Buffie (2006), I incorporated habit formation in 
deliberation costs in order to overcome the problem regarding the shape of consumption.  
In the numerical simulations with habit affecting deliberation costs, the paths of durables 
spending and total consumption spending are hump-shaped but the timing of the downturn 
is not quite right. In all of the runs, the turning points come at the end of the first quarter 
following the implementation of the program whereas the downturn in consumption boom 
came at the end of the third quarter in Turkey. 
      The paper is organized into six sections. First section presents the policy measures of 
the 2000-2001 ERBS program in Turkey and then discusses the macroeconomic 
developments after the implementation of the program. Section 2 lays out the model. 
Section 3 provides a brief sketch of the solution procedure and calibration. Section 4 
follows with numerical simulations and investigates the sensitivity of the results to key 
parameters. Section 5 examines the results of the habit incorporated model. The final 
section contains concluding remarks. 
1. 2000-2001 Turkish ERBS Program 
Turkey has had a long history of chronic and high inflation. Inflation started to take off 
during the 1970s, though fell briefly after the initiation of a far-reaching stabilization and 
liberalization program in January 1980, the success did not last long. Both public sector 
deficit and inflation reversed their declining pattern in the mid 1980s. Over the 1990s, the 
economy never achieved a period of sustained fiscal control. Public accounts continuously 
deteriorated except some small and short lived improvements in 1995 and 1998 caused by 
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the stabilization programs. Weak governments consisting of multiparty coalitions and 
frequent elections reflected in stop-go pattern of economic management, chronic and high 
inflation, and an increasing debt position.   
      Against this background, in an attempt to stabilize the Turkish economy plagued by the 
chronic inflation and high real interest rates; authorities launched an exchange-rate-based 
stabilization program in January 2000. The central bank moved from a “managed float” to 
a pre-announced exchange rate path against a currency basket composed of a weighted 
average of the euro and the US dollar. The programmed depreciation of the TL was equal 
to the WPI inflation target (20 percent) for the year of 2000. The exchange rate policy was 
to be assisted by a monetary policy similar to a currency board. Net domestic assets of the 
central bank were not to exceed their end-1999 level at the end of each quarter. Fiscal 
deficit was to be financed mainly by selling bonds. Sterilization was completely excluded. 
Therefore, base money was to be changed only in connection with balance of payments 
inflows or outflows, with interest rates being fully market determined. In order to break 
downward rigidity in inflation, the program also included temporary wage-prize controls.  
      As for the macroeconomic developments after the implementation of the program, they 
are in line with the general dynamics displayed by other ERBS programs. Upon the 
announcement, nominal interest rates declined immediately7. The sharp decline in interest 
rates was accompanied by a surge in spending. The real rate of growth in imports rose 
from -2 percent in 1999:3 to 5.2 percent in 1999:4 and jumped to quarterly rates of 34.9 
percent and 25.2 percent in the first half of 2000.  The surge in sales of durable goods and 
cars was remarkable. The growth rate in sales of durable goods jumped from 4.3 percent in 
December of 1999 to 62 percent in January of 2000, while the rate of growth of car sales 
jumped from 29 percent to 107.5. Because of the very strong upturn in domestic demand, 
real GDP which has fallen 5 percent in 1999, expanded at a rate of 7.4 percent in 2000. 
The program succeeded in reducing the inflation, but not enough to prevent the sizable real 
appreciation associated with ERBS episodes.  Due to slow convergence of inflation, real 
                                                 
7 Nominal interest rates on three month maturity of Treasury secondary market securities fell from 96.4 
percent in September 1999 to 51.6 percent in December upon the announcement of the program and 
continued to fall until mid-summer (OECD, 2001; Table.6). 
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exchange rate appreciated 16 percent by the end of 2000. Real appreciation was 
accompanied by massive net capital inflows by non-residents, which reached 15.5 billion 
US dollars by the end of October 2000. Surge in domestic absorption coupled with real 
appreciation of the domestic currency led to the rapid expansion in current account deficit 
reaching 9.8 billion US dollars (almost 5 % of GNP) by the end of the year. 
      By November 2000 IMF officials started to express their concerns on the widening 
current account deficit. On November 22nd, a financial distress emerged in domestic 
banking sector turned into a full-blown liquidity crisis in no time when the sustainability of 
the peg was called into question. More than one quarter of the total central bank reserves 
flowed out during the November crisis. Only after the announcement of the IMF package 
on 6 December, the capital outflow stopped. After a few months of muddling through to 
keep the nominal anchor at all costs, a second attack came on February 20th. The overnight 
interest rates jumped to sky-high levels and the central bank sold $5.2 billion within two 
days8. Two days later, the exchange rate system collapsed and domestic currency 
depreciated by 40 percent in a day. The currency peg was abandoned and replaced with a 
regime of free floating.   
      The economy fell into a severe recession in February 2001, which continued almost 
until the last quarter of 2002. Real GDP declined by 7.5 percent after expanding at a rate of 
7.4 percent in 2000. Of the consumption expenditures, the deepest slump was witnessed in 
durables, with contractions of 20.32 percent and 36.12 percent in the first half of 2001.  
After durables, the highest contraction was in imports, with annual real rates of growth of -
14.5 percent in the first quarter and -31 percent in the second quarters. Following the 
severe downturn in domestic absorption, the current account balance tilted to a surplus of 
3.3 billion US dollars from a deficit of 9.8 billion US dollars.  Post crisis fiscal policy in 
2001 relied mainly on severe contraction of non-interest expenditures and sharp increase in 
administered prices. Government consumption expenditures contracted substantially in real 
terms throughout the year. 
                                                 
8 Interbank weighted average overnight simple interest rates, which were 43 % on February 19th, jumped to 
2058 % on the 20th, peaked at 4019 % on the 21st , fell to 1195 % on the 22nd, then to 568 % on the 23rd, 
finally settled at around 100 % by end – February (Gokkent et.al , 2001). 
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2. The Model  
There are three financial assets in the model: domestic currency M, foreign currency F, and 
indexed treasury bonds. Both domestic and foreign currencies provide liquidity services. 
Considering the fact that Turkey has been a highly dollarized economy I prefer foreign 
currency rather than a foreign bond as the foreign asset. Over the 1990s, the ratio of 
foreign currency deposits to broad money has been 45-47 percent on average in Turkey. 
The share of foreign currency deposits in total deposits rose from 25.5 percent in 1990 to 
45.9 percent in 1999 and reached 57.6 percent by the end of 2001 9 even though the 
average real rates of return on TL denominated assets were generally higher than those on 
foreign currency denominated deposits10 . The collapse of the ERBS program in February 
2001 promoted currency substitution further. The level of foreign currency deposits which 
was $36 billion at the end of 2000 continued to increase and reached $45 billion in 2003. A 
recent study by the Fed also confirms that Turkey has been one of the highly dollarized 
economies in the world. In that study, Turkey ranks as the fifth largest US currency holder 
with an estimated $10 billion in circulation as of 2002. Another reason for choosing 
foreign currency rather than a foreign bond is to make sure that foreign and domestic 
currency assets are not perfect substitutes. In an optimizing, perfect –foresight model with 
an open capital account, domestic and foreign bonds are perfect substitutes and the 
domestic interest rate differs from the foreign rate only by the percentage depreciation of 
the exchange rate. Thus is not consistent with the data from developing countries. 
     The economy produces a nontraded good and a traded good. Real output in the 
tradables sector is fixed whereas it is demand determined in the nontradables sector. The 
nontraded good can be consumed either as a durable or a nondurable good. The private 
sector also consumes an imported durable good. World prices equal unity, so the domestic 
price of the tradable good is set by the nominal exchange rate e. P is the overall price level 
(i.e., consumer price index). Pn and γ denote the relative price of the nontraded good and 
its share in aggregate consumption respectively. Qi is output in sector i. F, m, and E are the 
                                                 
9 Bahmani-Oskooee and Domac (2002) 
10 Between 1990 and 2000, the average real rates of return on TL denominated deposits were 20 percent 
while the same rate were about 3 percent for foreign currency denominated deposits. See Civcir (2003). 
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stock of foreign currency, real money balances, and real nondurables expenditure 
measured in units of the traded good (i.e., measured in dollars).  
Prices 
The overall price level P is a geometric average of the prices of the traded and nontraded 
goods. Since the nominal exchange rate sets the domestic price of the traded good,  
P = e γnP       (1) 
The inflation rate is 
π = (1- γ ) χ +γ nπ       (2)  
where ndγγ ≡ dγ + neγ eγ ; dγ and eγ  are the respective weights of durables and nondurables 
in the CPI; njγ is the share of nontradables in total spending on consumer good of type j; 
χ is the rate of currency depreciation; and nπ is the rate of price growth in the nontradables 
sector. 
The Nontradables Sector 
The nontraded good can be consumed either as a nondurable or a durable good. 
Consumption on nontraded nondurables is given by the Marshallian demand function 
nC ( nP ,E ) and the demand for durables is given by gross new purchases of the nontraded 
durables, 1S . Since consumer purchases are the only source of demand, the nontradables 
market clears when 
nC ( nP ,E ) + 1S = nQ       (3) 
      Prices in the nontradables sector are sticky a la Calvo and Vegh (1993). Firms adjust 
prices only when they receive a random “price-change signal”. Firms that receive a signal 
choose a new price by forecasting the future paths of the price level and excess demand. 
Therefore, price adjustment is forward-looking. Forward-looking price setting is also 
consistent with the price setting behavior in the Turkish economy. Although part of public 
wage and price setting involves ex-post inflation indexation, wages have been determined 
flexibly in the private sector. Shiller (1997) as a matter of fact, shows Turkey as a 
surprising example of a country that has lived with persistently high inflation for such a 
long time without widespread indexation. Empirical findings in Celasun, Gelos, and Prati 
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(2003), and Celasun and McGettigan (2005) also fit with the limited evidence of 
indexation. Back to the model, Calvo (1983) shows that when the price-change signal 
obeys a Poisson process 
nnn PP )( χπ −=
•
      (4) 
( ) ,,
_
1 


 −+−=
•
nnnn QSEPCαπ     ,0>α       (5) 
where 
_
nQ denotes notional output (i.e., the level of output associated with a normal 
capacity utilization rate) and a dot signifies a time derivative (i.e.,
dt
dx
x =
•
). Equation (4) 
follows from the fact that, at any point in time, the nominal price of the nontraded good is 
fixed by past price quotations. (More precisely, at any time t the set of firms that adjust 
their prices is of measure zero.) Equation (5) is a higher-order Phillips Curve. It says that 
the change  in nπ , the inflation rate in the nontradable sector, is a decreasing function of 
excess demand. The parameter α  is larger the shorter the length of the average price 
quote. 
The Private Agent’s Optimization Problem 
All economic activity in the private sector is undertaken by a representative agent who 
posseses an instantaneous utility function of the form, 
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where 1D  is the stock of nontraded durables, 2D  is the stock of imported durables, 
( )Tn CCC , is an index of nondurables consumption and 4k is a constant which determines 
the ratio of nontraded durables to imported durables at the initial steady state equilibrium. 
( ),.iR  introduces a friction that prevents durables purchases from being too volatile. It 
captures the costs incurred when consumers adjust their durables stock through new 
durables purchases. As Bernanke emphasizes, new durables purchases are not easy or 
automatic. In contrast to nondurables spending, the decision to buy a durable often 
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involves time consuming search and careful deliberation. The utility cost of worrying and 
lost leisure time is assumed to be increasing, symmetric, and convex in net purchases of 
durable goods: ( ) ',00 ii RR =  0 as 
•
iD  0 and 
"
iR >0 
      The representative agent has homothetic preferences and possesses perfect foresight. 
The private agent’s optimization problem is solved in two stages. In the first stage, 
Tn CC , are chosen to maximize ( )Tn CCC , for given values of nP andE . Write this part of 
solution as ( )EPVC n ,* = . ),( EPV n  is a standard indirect utility function that measures 
felicity gained from consumption of nondurables )0,0( <>
nPE
VV . In the second stage, the 
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subject to the wealth constraint 
,bPFmA n
γ++=       (7) 
the budget constraint, 
( ) ( ) ,,1
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and, 
,111 cDSD −=
•
      (9) 
,222 cDSD −=
•
      (10) 
where ρ is the time preference rate, c  is the depreciation rate for durables, 
e
M
m = is the 
real domestic money balances, 
P
B
b =  is the real stock of bonds, r is the real interest, 
1S and 2S  represent the new purchases of nontraded and imported durables, 
21 SSPEY n ++=  is aggregate spending and 
_
g is lump sum transfers. Domestic and 
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foreign currencies are held to reduce transactions-costs11. Transactions costs, 




Y
Fm
YL
),(φ
, are assumed to be decreasing in the ratio of liquidity services φ  to 
aggregate spending. Liquidity services are generated by domestic and foreign currency. ( ).φ  
is homogeneous of degree one, increasing and strictly concave in m  and 
F ( )0,,0, <> FFmmFm φφφφ . (.)L is decreasing and strictly convex ( ) ( )( )0.,0. ''' >< LL . In 
the budget constraint, γnP  multiplies b because wealth is measured in dollars but bonds are 
indexed to the price level. Let ,, 21 ωω  and 3ω  be the multipliers attached to the constraints 
(8), (9) and (10). The first order conditions are 
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and the co-state equations are 
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Equation (11) states that the marginal utility of consumption of nondurables equals the 
shadow price of wealth times the effective price of nondurables consumption. Effective 
price consists of the market price of the good plus the transactions costs incurred by 
                                                 
11 See Rebelo and Vegh (1995), Reinhart and Vegh (1995), and Uribe (2002) for the same specification of 
transactions costs. 
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purchasing an additional unit of the good. Equations (12) and (13) are straightforward 
arbitrage conditions. Consumer equates, at the margin, the reduction in transaction costs 
that result from real holding of an additional domestic (or foreign) currency to its 
opportunity cost which is nominal interest rate for domestic currency. Equations (14), (15), 
(17) and (18) define a Tobin’s q model of durables purchases. 
nE
i
n
i
PV
Y
LLP
ω
φ
ω
ω
=





 −+ '1 1
, ( )3,2=i  is the ratio of the demand price (or shadow price) of a 
durable to its supply price. 'iR captures the additional adjustment costs incurred by 
increasing iS  a small amount. And equation (16) is simply an Euler equation.         
The Public Sector 
The public sector is composed of the government and the central bank. The central bank 
issues high powered money ( )M   in order to finance the fiscal deficit of the government 
and holds foreign exchange reserves ( )Z . I assume that the foreign exchange reserves do 
not bear interest. The central bank’s balance sheet is 
eZDCM +=       (19) 
whereDC is the central bank’s domestic credit to the government.   
 
Money is injected into the economy whenever the central bank accumulates foreign 
exchange reserves or runs the printing press to finance the fiscal deficit.  
,
•
•
•
+=+ Z
e
DC
mm χ       (20) 
The government makes lump sum transfers to the private agent and collects fees, ( ).YL , for 
liquidity services. Fees are then returned to the private sector through transfers. Therefore, 
lump sum transfers have two components: True transfers, gPn
γ  and rebated fees, 




Y
Fm
YL
),(φ
. 
( )
,
,_



+=
Y
Fm
YLgPg n
φγ      (21) 
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γ
nP  multiplies g because 
_
g  is measured in dollars but transfers are indexed to the price 
level. 
 In addition to paying out lump-sum transfers, the government makes unproductive 
purchases of X units of the traded good. The government also issues indexed domestic 
bonds which are held by the private agent. The government budget constraint is thus 
,
_
YLXbrPgbP
e
DC
nn −++=+
•
•
γγ  
or, 
,XbrPgPbP
e
DC
nnn ++=+
•
•
γγγ       (22) 
Combining equations (20) and (22) yields the consolidated public sector budget constraint 
,mZXbrPgPbPm nnn χ
γγγ −+++=+
•••
     (23) 
 
Crawling Peg and Bond-Financed Fiscal Deficit During ERBS  
At the pre-ERBS steady-state equilibrium, seigniorage pays for the entire fiscal deficit, the 
current account deficit is zero, the real interest rate equals the time preference rate, the real 
money supply and the real stock of bonds are constant. That is  
0χππ == n ,          (Pre-ERBS phase) 
0====
••••
FZbm ,     (Pre-ERBS phase) 
m
e
DC
0χ=
•
,       (Pre-ERBS phase) 
XbPgPm nn ++= 000
γγ ρχ        (Pre-ERBS phase) 
When the government lowers the rate of crawl from 0χ  to 1χ , the rate of domestic credit 
creation is set equal to the lower rate of crawl ( )1χ , and bond sales adjust as needed in 
order to cover the rest of the fiscal deficit.    
m
e
DC
1χ=
•
,   10 tt <≤           (ERBS phase)      (24) 
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 Therefore, during the ERBS phase b and m evolve according to  
,
••
= Zm     10 tt <≤           (ERBS phase)        (25) 
,1γ
χ
nP
mX
rbgb
−
++=
•
    10 tt <≤           (ERBS phase)       (26) 
      As it is pointed out in Rebelo and Vegh (1995) many ERBS programs got out off the 
track quickly due to insufficient fiscal adjustment12. As comes to the 2000-2001 Turkish 
ERBS, the program rested on an upfront fiscal adjustment worth of 6.5 percent of GNP in 
order to reduce the WPI inflation from 63 percent to 20 percent by the end of 2000. 
Although fiscal benchmarks were attained successfully the economy was hit by a severe 
currency crisis in November 2000; and the program collapsed after a couple of months. As 
in many other failed stabilization episodes post crisis fiscal policy relied on sharp fiscal 
adjustments. In 2001, government consumption expenditures fell by 8.5 percent in real 
terms. Given the circumstances, doubts arise about the sufficiency of initial fiscal 
adjustment to support a permanently lower crawl in Turkey. Accordingly, I assume that the 
reduction in the rate of crawl from 0χ  to 1χ  is not supported by a fiscal adjustment. 
Net Foreign Asset Accumulation and the Current Account Balance 
Adding consolidated public sector and private agent budget constraints yields 
,21 XSSPEQQPFZ nTnn −−−−+=+
••
 
or, 
XSSPEQQPFm nTnn −−−−+=+
••
21  
since 
••
= Zm  
      Under a crawling peg, the money supply adjusts endogenously through the capital 
account in order to satisfy money demand. But while domestic currency can be swapped 
for foreign currency at the central bank, the total dollar value of currency holdings 
                                                 
12For instance Argentine 1978 tablita, and 1986 Brazilian Cruzado.  
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predetermined. Thus we need to define FmJ +≡ as a state variable in the dynamic 
system. That is  
,21 XSSPEQQPJ nTnn −−−−+=
•
      (27) 
The Post-ERBS Period 
At time 1t , the program collapses, bond sales stop and the deficit is fully monetized. From 
1t onward, therefore, 0=
•
b and 
( ) ,1 mZXtbrPgPm nn χγγ −+++=
••
      1tt ≥ .     (Post-ERBS phase)     (28) 
 
When the program collapses, the government raises the crawl by the amountK  and curtails 
lump sum transfers g  by the amountW . I assume that the first adjustment in the crawl is 
inadequate and followed by further increases at the rate 
( )χχυχ −=
•
0 ,         ,0>υ            1tt ≥ ,        (29) 
 
The path for the crawl is described by (29) and the exogenous adjustment at time 1t is 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]11101 tteKKt −−−−−++= υχχχχ ,    1tt ≥ .     (30) 
 
Since the inflation will go to its original level 0χ  in the long run, any increase (or 
decrease) in domestic debt has to be offset by permanently lower (or higher) transfers. 
Therefore, after the program fails, g goes toward its post-stabilization level
≈
g , associated 
with permanently higher domestic debt. The path for g is 
),( ggyg −=
≈•
     ,0≥y          1tt ≥ .       (31) 
)(
1
1)()( ttyegtggtg −−
≈≈





 −+=           1tt ≥ .        (32) 
where 
( ) ooo Xtbmg −−=
≈
1ρχ  
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3. A Brief Sketch of the Solution Procedure and Model Calibration 
Solution Procedure 
Since the perfect foresight solution to the model generates a dynamic system with 
characteristic equation of a high-order polynominal there is no hope of deriving a closed-
form solution. It is necessary therefore to rely on a mix of numerical and analytical 
methods. Because the algebra is unpleasant, I skip over most of the details and simply 
outline the logic of the solution procedure. A more detailed mathematical solution is 
relegated to the appendix. 13 
 
The first step in the solution procedure is to eliminate the unobservable shadow prices 
from the dynamic system. Differentiating (11) with respect to time and substituting for 1
•
ω  
from (16) gives14 
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Applying the same thing to (14), (17) and (15), (18) produces 
 
                                                 
13 Appendix is available upon request 
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EV
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E−=τ  is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for nondurables, 
Y
L
L
φ
β
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the inverse of the elasticity of marginal utility of real liquidity holding, 
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 During the ERBS phase the dynamic system involves bJESSDDP nn ,,,,,,,, 2121π . 
Equations (33), (34), and (35) have variables (m , r , and nQ ) that change on the transition 
path although they are not part of the dynamic system. Therefore, we need to relate these to 
all other variables which belong to the system. To accomplish this, use (12) and (13) from 
the first order conditions and assume ( )Fm,φ  is a linearly homogeneous CES function 
with σ being the elasticity of substitution between m andF . In this case (12) and (13) 
yield 
( ) ( ) ( ),ˆˆˆ πβθ
σ
βσ
σ
βθσθ
ddr
i
YFm F
Fm +−=
−
+
+
     (36) 
( ) ( )
( )
( ),ˆˆˆ χπ
χ
β
σ
βθσθ
θ
σ
βσ
dddr
i
YFm mFm −+−
−=
+
+
−
      (37) 
where a circumflex indicates a percentage change (i.e., 
x
dx
x =ˆ ), π+= ri  is the nominal 
interest rate, and 
Fm
mm
Fm
mm
m φφ
φ
φ
φ
θ
+
=≡  ,        
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F φφ
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φ
θ
+
=≡  
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are the shares of liquidity services provided by domestic and foreign currency. Equations 
(36) and (37) can be solved for m  and r  as a function of χπ ,,,,,, 21 nn JSSPE . That is 
 
( )χ,,,,, 211 nPJSSEfm = ,   ( )nnPJSSEfr πχ ,,,,,, 212=      (38), (39) 
 
By using FmJ +≡ , (38) and (39) equations (33), (34), and (35) can be solved for 
21,,
•••
SSE . The full solutions are stated in the appendix. To economize on space, I express 
the solutions here in the general form 
( )nnPDDSSEfE π,,,,,, 21213=
•
,      (40) 
( )nnPDDSSEfS π,,,,,, 212141 =
•
,      (41) 
( )nnPDDSSEfS π,,,,,, 212122 =
•
,      (42) 
 
After obtaining the solution for the nQ  as a function of EPS n ,,1 ; equations (4), (5), (9), 
(10), (26), (27), (40), (41), (42) together with (38) and (39) define a self-contained system 
of nine differential equations in nSSE π,,, 21 , 21 ,,, DDPJ n and b . In this 99×  system which 
controls the equilibrium path during the stabilization period where the rate of crawl is 
constant; bDDPJ n ,,,, 21 are predetermined and nSSE π,,, 21  are jump variables.  
      In the post-ERBS period, 
•
b (equation 26) drops out, and χ and g enter through (29) and 
(31) as additional state variables ( χ and g  jump at 1t , but the jumps are exogenous.) This 
produces a 1010× system in which gDDPJ n ,,,,, 21 χ  are predetermined and 
nSSE π,,, 21 are jump variables. Thus, the dynamic system that takes over at time 1t  is 
saddlepoint stable iff six of the system’s ten eigenvalues are negative.  
       
      I assume that the reduction in the rate of crawl catches the public by surprise. The 
subsequent policy reversal at 1t , however, is perfectly anticipated. The public knows from 
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the outset that ERBS is not sustainable and the government will eventually abandon the 
policy at time 1t . From 0=t  up to time 1t , the economy follows a nonconvergent path of 
the system associated with the low rate of crawl, 1χ . At time 1t , this path connects with the 
saddle path that leads back pre-ERBS equilibrium.  
Model Calibration 
In order to prepare the model for calibration I use the following functional forms in order 
to describe preferences, the production of liquidity services, transactions costs and 
deliberation costs 
( )
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where 61 kk −  are distributional parameters and σδτ ,,  are, respectively, the intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution for nondurables, the elasticity of substitution between traded and 
nontraded nondurable, and the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign 
currency. Deliberation costs are a quadratic function of new durables purchases. The 
specification of transactions costs is the same as in Reinhart and Vegh (1995) and Uribe 
(2002), with liquidity services generated by a CES aggregate of domestic and foreign 
currency. The computer needs the number for substitution parameters, initial asset 
holdings, the rate of crawl before and after ERBS, etc., in order to solve the model. Table 5 
lists the values for the base case and the alternative simulations. With respect to the 
choices: 
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Intertemporal elasticity of substitution for nondurables )(τ  and durables )(ψ . Estimates 
for LDCs place the elasticity of intertemporal substitution between 0.20 and 0.50 (Agenor 
and Montiel, 1999, Table 12.1). I used therefore 0.25 and 0.50 as the low and high values 
for the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. 
 
The elasticity of substitution between traded and nontraded nondurables )(δ . The value 
set for this parameter agrees with the empirical studies that the scope for substitution is 
limited at high levels of aggregation. 
 
The elasticity of substitution between foreign and domestic currency )(σ . Estimates for 
Latin America range from one to six. I decided to set σ at 2 which is also close to the 
estimate for Turkey (1.4) in Selcuk (2003). Then I used 0.50 in the alternative run. 
 
Convexity of the transactions costs function )(β . Reinhart and Vegh (1995), Rossi (1989), 
and Arrau et al. (1995) have estimated interest elasticity of money demand by using money 
demand functions of the type used in this model. Ignoring Arrau et al.’s estimate for Brazil 
(3.26 is implausibly high) the average of the estimated interest elasticities for Chile, 
Argentina, Brazil, Israel, Mexico, and Uruguay is 0.36. Including Arrau et al.’s estimate 
for Brazil, it is 0.72. Setting β  at 0.25 makes the interest elasticity of money demand 0.56 
in the base run which is consistent with the simple average of 0.36 and 0.72. For Turkey, 
the estimates of inflation elasticity of money demand range from 2.62 to 2.9 (Ozmen, 
1998; Selcuk, 2001; Ozdemir and Turner, 2004) that makes interest elasticity of money 
demand around 2.25 which is unreasonably high. 
 
Depreciation rate for durables )(c . There is no data for LDCs. Following Buffie and 
Atolia (2005) I fix this parameter at 0.10. 
 
Time preference rate )(ρ . Time preference rate plays two roles in the model: it discounts 
future utility and determines the steady state real rate of return on domestic bonds. 
Therefore I chose 0.10 for ρ  which is actually still low given that the real interest rates 
have been in the range of 12%-16% in Turkey over the nineties.  
 
Speed of price adjustment in the nontradables sector )(α . I let α  to vary between 3 and 1. 
The value assigned in the base case implies that price adjustment is fast but not 
instantaneous.  
 
Length of the ERBS program )( 1t . The low crawl lasts one year to be consistent with 
Turkey. 
 
q-elasticity of durables spending )(Ω . Not much is known about the magnitude ofΩ . 
Baxter and Crucini (1993) and Rebelo and Vegh (1995) set Ω  at 15. Baxter (1996) sets Ω  
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at 200. Buffie and Atolia (2005) and Buffie and Atolia (2006) place it in a range of 3-10. I 
on the other hand, put Ω  in a range of 3-5.  
 
Rate of crawl before vs. during ERBS ),( 10 χχ I cut the rate of crawl from an initial value 
of 60% to 20% during ERBS.   
 
Ratio of foreign currency to national income ( OF ). The number for ratio of foreign 
currency to national income (0.12) is in line with the data. Dollarization ratio, the ratio of 
foreign currency deposits to broad money, has been 45%-47% on average in Turkey over 
the 1990s. Besides, a significant portion of liquid assets is held in foreign currency, which 
is labeled as “under the mattress dollars”. Therefore, 45%-47% should be considered only 
as a lower bound for dollarization in Turkey.  
 
Ratio of domestic currency to national income ( 0m ).  The number for the sum of currency 
held by the public plus reserves of commercial banks as % of GDP (0.08) is in line with 
the data. 
 
Ratio of domestic debt to national income ( 0b ). Central government debt held by the 
private sector was 29.3% in Turkey at the end of 1999. 
Consumption share of durables )(
_
dγ
15. Following Buffie and Atolia (2005) I set this at 
0.20. Weight of durables in the Turkish CPI is 0.073. This figure however, imputes a 
service flow to housing and excludes it. Adding the CPI share of housing, which is 0.258, 
raises the CPI share of durables to 0.33, which is also consistent with the value assigned to 
the consumption share of durables.   
 
Share of nontradables in nondurables expenditure and in durables expenditure ),( nend γγ . 
Share of nontradables in the Turkish CPI is 0.58. According to the data in Burnstein, 
Neves, and Rebelo (2001), tradable consumer goods include a large nontraded distribution 
component and distribution costs amount to 60% of the retail price for durable and 
nondurable goods in Argentina. Taking this into account raises the weight of nontradables 
in the Argentine CPI to 0.71. Since there is no data for Turkey regarding to distribution 
costs, I used the share of nontradables in the Argentine CPI in order to set the initial shares 
for ndγ  and neγ . 
 
Paths of currency depreciation and government spending in the post-ERBS period (the two 
slope parameters υ  and y , and the two jumps K  and W ). At the end of ERBS the rate of 
crawl jumps from 20% to 40% and government spending (lump-sum transfers) is cut by 
6% of initial GDP. Following the initial adjustment, crawl rate and lump sum transfers rise 
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steadily at rates controlled by υ  and y . The two jumps at the end of the program and the 
slope parameters υ  and y were chosen to be consistent with post-crisis period Turkey: 
Following the float of the domestic currency on February 22th, exchange rate depreciated 
very fast in the second and third quarters and stabilized as of November 2001. Fiscal 
adjustment was very fast therefore, I set the slope parameter so that lump-sum transfers are 
at the new long-run level 6 months after the program collapsed.  
 
4. Numerical Solutions 
Figures 1-8 present the solution paths for the base case and for the cases where 
intertemporal substitution is stronger for nondurables ( 50.0=τ ) or for durables 
( 50.0=ψ ), domestic and foreign currencies are not close substitutes ( 75.0=σ ),  interest 
elasticity of money demand is smaller ( 10.0=β ), q-elasticity of durables spending is 
higher, price adjustment is faster ( 3=α ), and prices are stickier ( 1=α ). The paths track 
the percentage deviation of the stated variable from its pre-ERBS value. Total consumption 
is nondurables consumption plus total durables purchases, the current account balance is 
measured as a percentage of GDP, and the positive values for the change in the real 
exchange rate signify appreciation. For an easy comparison, Table 6 collects the results of 
the consumption paths.  
      Despite the shortness of the ERBS period16, almost all of the runs capture the stylized 
facts. Equally important, the numbers for the consumption boom, the current account 
deficit, and the appreciation of the real exchange rate are of the same order of magnitude as 
observed in the aftermath of the ERBS program in Turkey. Led by an eye-catching surge in 
durables purchases, total consumption spending increases 7-8% on average. Current 
account deficit soars to 3-5.5% of GDP. The real exchange rate appreciates 16-20% before 
the end of the program. Both the boom and the contractionary phases in consumption are 
driven by durables. During the boom phase, the percentage increase in durables 
expenditure is 3-4 times larger than the increase in total consumption spending. When the 
recession hits, spending on durables contracts 2-3 times more than spending on total 
consumption.   
                                                 
16 Average length is three year in Calvo and Vegh (1999) data set for major ERBS episodes.  
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      While the results are generally parallel to the empirical regularities associated with 
ERBS, they display some variation in terms of the magnitude of the consumption boom, 
the amount of real exchange rate appreciation and the severity of the recession. Below I 
comment on the logic underlying these variations. 
      The consumption boom: The magnitude of the initial boom displays variations across 
the runs. In the best run ( 10.0=β ) for instance, total consumption spending and total 
durables purchases increase 10% and 37% respectively and current account deficit swells 
to 5.5% of GDP. Because reducing β  makes interest elasticity of money demand smaller, 
the temporary windfall gain delivered by the lower crawl rate is larger. Specifically, the 
decline in the inflation tax following the announcement of the low crawl increases the 
private disposable income. Since the program is believed to be abandoned at some point in 
the future, the private agent will try to save his temporarily higher disposable income by 
making large purchases of durables. Increasing intertemporal elasticity of substitution of 
durables does not deliver a larger increase in durables spending. Conversely, the increase 
in durables is slightly smaller when ψ  is 0.50. The reason is that spending on durables is 
driven mainly by “intertemporal price speculation” rather than intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution. Durable goods generate services long after the date of purchase, so 
irrespective of the magnitude of intertemporal elasticity of substitution there is always an 
incentive to make large purchases of durables when its price is temporarily lower. Strong 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution of nondurables ( 50.0=τ ) makes the percentage 
increase in nondurables at least two times larger. In terms of its effect on the increase in 
total consumption spending however, making τ  bigger does not deliver a considerable 
difference since the heavy lifting belongs to durables.   
      Ease of currency substitution: A well known fact about inflation stabilization episodes 
is that slowdown in inflation is typically accompanied by strong money demand and 
reverse currency substitution. Note from the first-order conditions (12) - (13), at the initial 
steady state χρ +  is the opportunity of cost of holding domestic currency while ρ  is the 
opportunity cost of holding foreign currency.  A reduction in crawl obviously reduces the 
opportunity cost of domestic currency hence stimulates a reverse currency substitution. 
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From the same first-order conditions it is easily seen that one unit of domestic currency 
provides more liquidity services than one unit of foreign currency does17.  Therefore, the 
private agent ends up with more liquidity services by simply swapping foreign for 
domestic currency. If that’s the case then the private agent may increase his consumption 
of liquidity services by holding more domestic currency but less total currency (domestic 
plus foreign) and meanwhile consume part of his stock of broad money assets. As long as 
domestic and foreign currencies are close substitutes ( 2=σ ) this is true. In all of the runs, 
except σ =0.75, total currency holding declines considerably during ERBS.  This is what 
Buffie and Atolia (2005) call “spending down of wealth” effect and it operates in seven of 
the eight simulations. Compared to the other simulations the results of the run with 
σ =0.75 are poor and unrealistic; suggesting that σ =0.75 is too low for an economy like 
Turkey where capital inflows/outflows are extremely fast.  
      Speed of price adjustment: Stickier prices in the nontraded goods sector leads to a 
larger real exchange rate appreciation (24% vs. 19% in the base case); and more severe and 
prolonged recession. Total consumption spending is still 2.34% below its pre-ERBS value 
two years after the collapse of the program.   
      
       In addition to replicating the general qualitative effects of a currency peg, the model 
can also account quantitatively for the responses of consumption and current account 
balance observed in Turkey. Table 7 provides a quantitative comparison of the numerical 
simulation results with the actual numbers observed during the ERBS episode in Turkey. 
The model does very well at replicating the magnitude of the current account deficit (5.5% 
of GDP predicted vs. 5% of GNP actual), the peak in total consumption spending (10.08% 
predicted vs. 9.6% actual), average growth rate in total consumption spending (6.7% 
predicted vs. 6% actual), the peak in durables spending (37.06% predicted vs. 39.5% 
actual), and the average growth rate in durables spending (24% predicted vs. 27.4% 
actual).  
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5. Habit Formation 
The model can account reasonably well for the empirical regularities observed in Turkey 
after the implementation of ERBS in January 2000. But it does a poor job of accounting for 
the timing of how consumption responds: In all of the numerical simulations, there’s a 
once-and-for-all increase in consumption at the time the lower crawl rate is announced, and 
then the consumption declines steadily. During ERBS episodes, however, consumption 
first increases gradually for a while, reaches a peak at some point before the abandonment 
of the currency peg, and then declines.  Another problem is that the rate of growth in 
consumption drops below its pre-ERBS level before the program collapses which is not 
consistent with actual ERBS episodes where the consumption growth does not drop below 
its pre-ERBS level until after the policy collapse. 
      The results in Atolia and Buffie (2006) suggests that a model with habit  affecting 
deliberation costs may induce hump-shaped profiles for durables spending and total 
consumption spending which agrees with the data. Following Atolia and Buffie (2006), the 
private agent experiences psychological unease when durables spending, iS  ( =i 1, 2), 
varies from its customary level. In other words, deliberation costs depend on how fast the 
stock of habit changes 
( ) ii
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1
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

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
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=   
( ),iii HSH −=
•
ν          0>ν  
where ν  indicates the rate at which the habit stock catches up with durables spending.  
      Since habit-forming agents dislike changes in their habit-adjusted durables spending 
levels, habit formation moderates durables spending growth and thereby total consumption 
spending in the early and late stages of ERBS. For habit-forming agents, a once-and-for all 
increase in durables spending at the time of policy announcement is not optimal because 
the increase in habit stock that results from higher durables spending makes future 
marginal utilities of durables consumption larger than today’s. Habit-formation thus 
mitigates the intertemporal substitution effect brought about by currency peg and induces 
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private agents to increase their path of durables spending gradually. Habit-forming agents 
also start reducing their stock of habit by cutting back durables spending before the 
program collapses and the relative price of consumption goes back to its pre-ERBS level.   
      Figure 9 shows the solution paths when 5.6=ν 18. Results reveal a marked 
improvement in the model’s performance regarding the timing of the response of durables 
spending and total consumption spending. Both durables and total consumption spending 
display hump-shaped paths with the downturn coming towards the end of the first quarter 
after the program is implemented. Durable spending does not drop below its pre-ERBS 
level until after the collapse whereas the total consumption growth drifts into negative 
figures at the time the program ends. In the model without habit, the recovery in 
consumption starts right at the time the program ends. Allowing for habit makes both 
durables spending and total consumption spending follow their contractionary trend 
throughout the year after the currency peg is abandoned, which is also more consistent 
with the Turkish ERBS episode. Habit incorporated model does a reasonably good job at 
accounting for both the qualitative and quantitative effects of ERBS program. Compared to 
the 2000-2001 ERBS episode in Turkey however, it has a single shortcoming: The turning 
points in consumption boom come toward the end of the first quarter following the 
implementation of the program whereas the downturn in consumption boom came at the 
end of the third quarter in Turkey. Although I tried to move the turning points in 
consumption forward by changing parameters, the results suggest that the timing of the 
downturn is quite robust. 19 
6. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper I have analyzed the real effects of a temporary heterodox ERBS program 
where bond sales finance the fiscal deficit and money growth occurs only through capital 
inflows. The model allows for consumption of both durables and nondurables. In order to 
asses the model’s quantitative performance; it is calibrated by using data restrictions 
mainly from the Turkish economy.  Results show that adding consumer durables improves 
                                                 
18 The stock of habit covers 80% of the distance to its new long-run level within one quarter. 
19 The rest of the simulation results when habit affects deliberation costs are available upon request from the 
author.  
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the quantitative performance of weak credibility hypothesis considerably. Without 
appealing to high intertemporal elasticity of substitution, the model can generate 
consumption boom, the current account deficit, and real exchange rate appreciation that are 
comparable to those observed in Turkey in the aftermath of 2000-2001 ERBS program. 
The single major shortcoming is regarding the timing of the response of consumption. 
Instead of displaying an inverted-U shape, consumption declines steadily after a one time 
jump at the time the policy is announced. Following Atolia and Buffie (2006), I 
incorporated habit formation in deliberation costs in order to overcome the problem 
regarding the shape of consumption.  In the numerical simulations with habit affecting 
deliberation costs, the paths of durables spending and total consumption spending are 
hump-shaped but the timing of the downturn is not quite right. Consumption boom peaks 
too early, and the turning points come at the end of the first quarter following the 
implementation of the program whereas the downturn in consumption boom came at the 
end of the third quarter in Turkey.  
      The main reason of consumption boom peaking too early is the price setting 
mechanism in the nontraded goods sector. Prices are sticky, thus at any point in time the 
nominal price of the nontraded good is fixed by past price quotations. Producers know that 
the program will be abandoned at some point and the relative price of the nontraded good 
will decline. Thus, they keep increasing the prices even after the demand for nontraded 
good starts to decline. Since prices in the nontraded goods sector do not follow the demand 
closely, consumption boom does not last long. Developing a flexible price version of the 
model with CES production functions in the two sectors might induce better results. 
Because when prices are flexible, they will probably track the demand for nontraded 
goods. And there is a high chance that I will get a more gradual consumption boom with 
downturn coming at the right time. 
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1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
(as % of GNP)
Current Account Balance * -1.7 0.2 -0.6 -3.5 2.0 -1.4 -2.9 -1.4 1.0 -0.7 -4.9 1.3
Foreign Debt Stock 32.2 33.2 34.6 37.0 49.6 43.1 42.9 43.3 46.8 54.9 59.0 79.0
Domestic Debt Stock 6.1 6.8 11.7 12.8 14.0 14.6 18.5 20.2 21.7 29.3 29.0 69.2
Central Government Budget Balance * -3.0 -5.3 -4.3 -6.7 -3.9 -4.0 -8.3 -7.6 -7.3 -11.9 -10.9 -16.9
Central Government Primary Budget Balance * 0.5 -1.5 -0.6 -0.9 3.8 3.3 1.7 0.1 4.3 1.8 5.3 6.4
PSBR ** 7.4 10.2 10.6 12.3 7.9 5.0 8.6 7.7 9.4 15.5 11.8 16.4
Short-term foreign debt as % of 159.1 185.4 207.0 298.3 159.0 126.7 104.9 96.0 105.3 98.9 127.6 87.3
Central Bank's FX reserves
Dollarization*** 25.5 33.6 38.6 44.3 51.7 53.0 48.5 50.4 46.7 45.9 45.3 57.6
Total interest payments as % of  20.8 18.5 18.2 24.0 33.2 33.7 38.0 28.5 39.6 38.2 43.5 50.6
total budget expenditures
Interest payments on domestic debt 21.2 21.5 21.6 35.0 39.7 43.9 59.2 41.7 61.0 66.4 70.9 94.4
as % of total tax revenues
Real interest rates on domestic borrowing -3.9 8.7 10.4 12.9 28.2 17.4 30.4 22.3 20.5 27.1 -10.9 27.1
CPI (average annual % change) 60.3 66.0 70.0 66.0 106.3 89.1 80.4 85.8 84.6 64.9 54.9 54.4
CPI (annual % change, Dec to Dec) 60.4 71.1 66.0 71.1 125.5 76.0 79.8 99.1 69.7 68.8 39.0 68.5
Real effective exchange rate 117.0 112.9 114.9 125.7 95.7 103.1 101.7 115.9 120.9 127.3 147.6 116.3
Source: Central Bank of Republic of Turkey, Treasury, SIS, Bahmani-Oskooee and Domac (2002)
* (+) sign indicates surplus
** PSBR is public sector borrowing requirement 
*** FX deposits as a percentage of total deposits (end year)
Real interests on domestic borrowing were obtained from annual average compounded interest rates on domestic borrowing deflated by annual average CPI inlation.
Real effective exchange rate is CPI based and increase denotes appreciation.
Table.1 Financial and Fiscal Indicators for the Turkish Economy
Total Durables Semi-durables Expenditure Imports GDP GNP Real interest rate on Exchange rate
        consumption consumption consumption on services Treasury bonds * ($/TL) **
2000Q1  4.01 24.15 -1.66 6.49 34.89 5.61 4.17 -15.80 60.70
2000Q2  4.61 26.75 -7.69 7.21 25.26 6.93 5.41 -9.50 49.50
2000Q3  9.63 39.51 8.14 7.86 23.48 7.84 7.24 -7.20 46.60
2000Q4  5.56 19.28 5.37 8.29 19.55 8.55 7.83 6.30 28.60
2001Q1  -2.99 -20.32 3.80 -2.07 -14.47 -0.99 -3.32 117.50 64.60
2001Q2  -11.99 -36.12 -12.46 -12.50 -31.00 -9.79 -12.28 16.50 96.50
2001Q3  -9.86 -31.07 -9.88 -9.28 -26.47 -7.52 -9.14 7.30 116.50
2001Q4  -11.34 -33.25 -19.00 -11.49 -25.95 -10.34 -12.32 -7.80 114.20
2002Q1  -1.86 -7.00 -2.09 2.02 2.49 2.3 0.59 -3.70 41.90
2002Q2  3.17 8.66 4.33 10.04 20.36 8.95 10.44 17.20 25.60
Data source: Central Bank of Republic of Turkey
Consumption figures belong to private sector
* Real interest rate values are from Table.1 in Yeldan (2002b) and they are compunded interest rate on three-month Treasury bonds, deflated by the WPI
** Annual rate of change over the same period of the previous year
(over the same period of the previous year)
Table.2  Annual Real Rate of Growth (%) 
Jan 2000 - Oct 2000 Nov 2000 - Sept 2001
Net Capital Flows (non-residents) 15571 -12772
Foreign direct investment 589 2962
Portfolio * 6789 -9063
Long-term flows 3643 -224
Short-term flows 4550 -6447
Net Capital Flows (residents) ** -2466 -1388
Foreign direct investment -751 -497
Portfolio -730 69
Short-term flows -985 -960
Data source: Central Bank of Republic of Turkey
* Of the 6789 million US dollars net portfolio inflows (non-residents) , 5518 million US dollars came through government's bond issue in foreign markets.
** (-) sign indicates capital outflows through residents
Table.3  Capital Flows  During the ERBS Episode (Million US dollars)
Sales of durables Sales of cars Production of durables
Dec-99 4.3 29.0 23.3
Jan-00 62.0 107.4 37.0
Feb-00 77.0 94.7 36.6
Mar-00 19.3 77.0 21.6
Apr-00 15.7 49.0 23.8
May-00 22.7 86.0 23.9
Jun-00 13.0 67.4 11.4
Jul-00 14.3 86.0 21.0
Aug-00 52.1 148.4 48.7
Sep-00 26.7 77.2 26.4
Oct-00 14.7 105.0 17.6
Nov-00 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Dec-00 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Jan-01 12.9 -29.4 19.3
Feb-01 -18.3 -64.3 -12.0
Mar-01 -15.6 -78.8 -19.7
Apr-01 -31.0 -72.6 -24.2
May-01 -19.1 -72.3 -25.0
Jun-01 -28.8 -70.9 -27.4
Jul-01 -4.1 -68.0 -19.4
Aug-01 -22.6 -72.2 -18.6
Sep-01 -14.1 -85.0 -16.5
Oct-01 -10.9 -85.5 -13.5
Nov-01 -4.7 -75.6 -2.0
Dec-01 3.3 -42.9 12.9
Source: Turkish State Planning Organization and the Treasury
Table.4 Indicators of Consumption Spending
(Percentage change over the same period of the previous year)
Table 5. Calibration of the Model 
 
Parameter                       Base value   Alternative 
 
Length of ERBS ( 1t )      1     _ 
                                        
Elasticity of substitution between tradable and 
nontradable nondurable consumer goods (δ )              .40     _                                                            
 
The elasticity of substitution between  
foreign and domestic currency )(σ       2    .75                                                
 
Convexity of the transactions costs function )(β   .25    .10 
                                                               
Intertemporal elasticity of substitution for nondurables )(τ  .25    .50     
 
Intertemporal elasticity of substitution for durables )(ψ      .25    .50 
 
Depreciation rate for durables )(c     .10     _ 
 
Time preference rate )(ρ      .10     _ 
 
Speed of price adjustment in the nontradables sector )(α    2     1 and 3 
 
q-elasticity of durables spending )(Ω        3     5 
 
Ratio of domestic currency to national income ( 0m )   .08     _  
 
Ratio of foreign currency to national income ( OF )   .12     _ 
 
Ratio of domestic debt to national income ( 0b )                .30     _ 
 
Consumption share of durables )(
_
dγ      .20     _ 
 
Share of nontradables in nondurables expenditure 
 and in durables expenditure ),( nend γγ                  .70     _ 
 
Rate of crawl before vs. during ERBS ),( 10 χχ                    60% vs. 20%     _ 
                             
Path of currency depreciation in the post-ERBS period     crawl jumps from 20% to 
                40% at 1t ; υ =3 
 
Path government spending in the post-ERBS period          transfer payments decrease by 6% 
                                                                                             of initial GDP at  1t ; y =5 
Table 6: Summary of solutions for the paths of total consumption, total durables spending, 
and non-durables consumption* 
 
Base Case 
  t = 0  t = 1  t = 1  t = 2  t = 3 
Total  6.27  -3.20  -3.97  -3.24  -1.53   
Durables 23.03  -5.89  -7.72  -6.75  -2.25 
Non-durables 2.15  -2.54  -3.05  -2.37  -1.36 
 
10.0=β   
  t = 0  t = 1  t = 1  t = 2  t = 3 
Total  10.08  -3.68  -4.57  -3.64  -1.73 
Durables 37.06  -7.82  -9.92  -8.30  -3.06 
Non-durables 3.44  -2.66  -3.25  -2.50  -1.41 
 
5=Ω  
  t = 0  t = 1  t = 1  t = 2  t = 3 
Total  8.33  -3.64  -4.65  -3.64  -1.54 
Durables 34.34  -8.41  -11.44  -9.15  -2.40 
Non-durables 1.92  -2.46  -2.98  -2.28  -1.32 
 
50.0=τ  
  t = 0  t = 1  t = 1  t = 2  t = 3 
Total  9.26  -4.74  -6.36  -3.98  -1.46 
Durables 26.75  -9.07  -13.07  -7.35  -1.37 
Non-durables 4.95  -3.68  -4.71  -3.15  -1.48 
 
50.0=ψ  
  t = 0  t = 1  t = 1  t = 2  t = 3 
Total  5.73  -2.84  -3.42  -3.09  -1.57 
Durables 20.26  -3.77  -4.60  -5.65  -2.34 
Non-durables 2.15  -2.62  -3.13  -2.46  -1.38 
 
75.0=σ  
  t = 0  t = 1  t = 1  t = 2  t = 3 
Total  1.30  -3.22  -3.84  -2.64  -1.08 
Durables 4.74  -5.95  -7.41  -4.53  -0.52 
Non-durables 0.44  -2.55  -2.96  -2.17  -1.22 
 
3=α   
                             t = 0  t = 1  t = 1  t = 2  t = 3 
Total  6.25  -2.75  -3.54  -2.71  -1.15 
Durables 22.76  -5.03  -6.86  -5.82  -1.82 
Non-durables 2.2  -2.2  -2.72  -1.93  -0.98 
 
1=α   
  t = 0  t = 1  t = 1  t = 2  t = 3 
Total  6.31  -3.9  -4.67  -4.18  -2.34  
Durables 23.57  -7.21  -9.04  -8.43  -3.30  
Non-durables 2.06  -3.1  -3.6  -3.14  -2.1 
 
* Percentage deviations from the pre-ERBS value. 
   In the table, first t = 1 are pre-jump values and second t = 1 are post-jump values.  
Highest real rate of growth observed in 2000
Total consumption 9.60%
Durables consumption 39.50%
Current account deficit 5%
Peak values from the numerical simulations
Total consumption 10.08%
Durables consumption 37.06%
Current account deficit 5.50%
Average real rate of growth in 2000 
Total consumption 6%
Durables consumption 27.40%
Average values from the numerical simulations
Total consumption 6.69%
Durables consumption 24.06%
Table 7. Model Predictions vs Actual Numbers from Turkey
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Figure1 : Transition path in the base run
Figure1.nb 1
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Figure 2 : Transition path when τ = 0.5
Figure2.nb 1
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Figure 3 : Transition path when ψ = 0.5
Figure3.nb 1
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Figure 4 : Transition path when β = 0.10
Figure4.nb 1
Show@GraphicsArray@88tanju2, tanju4<, 8tanju10, tanju8<, 8tanju6, arun14<<DD
0 2 4 6 8 10
-0.003
-0.002
-0.001
0.001
0.002
0.003
0.004
0.005
current account balance
0 2 4 6 8 10
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
Real exchange rate
0 2 4 6 8 10
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0.02
0.04
nontradables output
0 2 4 6 8 10
-0.035
-0.03
-0.025
-0.02
-0.015
-0.01
-0.005
0.005
nondurables consumption
0 2 4 6 8 10
-0.05
-0.04
-0.03
-0.02
-0.01
0.01
0.02
total real consumption
0 2 4 6 8 10
-0.08
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0.02
0.04
0.06
total durables spending
 GraphicsArray 
Figure 5 : Transition path when σ = 0.75
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Figure 6 : Transition path when Ω = 5
Figure6.nb 1
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Figure 7 : Transition path when price adjustment is faster Hα = 3L
Figure7.nb 1
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Figure 8 : Transition path with stickier prices Hα = 1L
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Figure 9 : Base run transition path when habit affects deliberation costs
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